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Abstract  
The study of the expectations hypothesis has been one which has led to much rejection and 
acceptance in relation to the term structure of interest rates. This paper seeks to observe how the 
credibility of central banks is affected by the different regimes and developments over time 
such as the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. The observation will be conducted in the context of 
advanced and emerging market economies. Therefore, a measure of central bank credibility is 
hypothesized and measured using the yield spread where short term rates and tests of 
significance is used extensively. In addition, the study will go further to test the how the 
conduct of central banks money supply affect expected rates. This allows us to unfold how a 
market efficiently responds greatly to unanticipated interest rate movement or policy regime 
changes rather than central bank announcements 
Findings of this study validates that the credibility of central banks is evaluated greatly through 
the short interest rate as well as previous expected rates. On this basis, the study thus accepts 
the notion that the yield curve contains information in correspondence to the expectations 
hypothesis which aid in predicting future expected interest rates. Furthermore, future expected 
rates decay after a lag for most countries. In practical terms for a successive monetary policy, 
central banks should carry out an optimal rule-like behaviour bearing in mind to consider 
unexpected contingencies which could affect its credibility. This is especially in response to 
current unconventional policies sanctioned post US subprime crisis. Therefore, a 
recommendation for central banks to be successive would be to strike a good balance between 
the credibility of its announcements and the flexibility to adjust to unanticipated events.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
This paper investigates the effects of the credibility of monetary policy on central banks in both 
emerging markets and advanced economies. Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue that for monetary 
policy to be credible, monetary authority must follow a rule that agents believe is not going to change. 
King (1995) defines credibility as good reputation, which means that the public must believe that the 
central bank will follow through its announced commitment. Caprioli and Gnocchi (2009) imply that 
credibility is the ability of monetary authority to commit and fulfil its promises. As pointed out by 
Garfinkel and Oh (1995) and Duffy and Heinemann (2014) central banks must strike a balance between 
credibility and flexibility.  A central bank that puts more weight on fluctuations of real economic activity 
is likely to be less credible as an inflation manager.  Conversely, more weight on inflation volatility 
implies less credibility to manage fluctuations in real economic activity. Central banks are therefore 
faced with the trade-off between inflation and economic activity in the short run 
Monetary policy credibility is important now, especially because interest rates in advanced economies 
have reached the zero lower bound. Major central banks e.g. the Fed, Bank of England and the ECB, 
have adopted unconventional policies such as quantitative easing to steer the economy out of the 
recession. One of the channels through which these policies work is through their effect on long-term 
interest rates. This is the impact of monetary policy actions on long-term rates depending on short-term 
market expectations which shape the direction of future policy (Roley and Sellon, 1995). Also, in many 
emerging market economies, net capital inflows rely on the management of central bank intermediation 
in its foreign exchange market (Mallick and Sousa, 2012). 
The expectation hypothesis articulates that the long-term rate is the sum of the average of current short 
rate and expected future short-term interest rates plus a term premium (Engsted and Tanggaard, 1994). 
Numerous studies have proven that the term structure of interest rates contain useful evidence about the 
movement of future interest rates through the expectations hypothesis. At the same time, some authors 
have documented to reject the hypothesis. Nonetheless, not much study has focused on the behaviour 
of expectations of countries which possess a common economic feature. Most research has rather 
focused on economies either individually or by regional placement (Klau and Mohanty, 2004). 
Therefore, by measuring the impact of monetary policy credibility through the expectations hypothesis, 
this work will seek to contribute towards the study of the trade-off relationship between flexibility and 
credibility over time. Specifically, the economic feature will be in the context of Advanced Economies 
(AE) and Emerging Market Economies (EME)  
The Taylor rule (1993) is a simple monetary policy prescribing how central banks regulates its interest 
rate instruments in a manner that is systematic to respond to the developments in inflation and other 
macroeconomic pressures (Rules and Orphanides, 2007). Taylor (1993) viewed the design of 
monetary policy as either being optimal, in the sense that policy rule is systematic and methodological 
and therefore a provides a pre-committed solution or being discrete in the sense that an inconsistent 
and short-sighted change is used as a solution. The former notion described has a greater influence on 
the idea of how central banks strike a balance between credibility and flexibility. With rule-like 
behaviour, central banks can combine it with the expectations hypothesis. As the expectations 
hypothesis is used for predicting short term interest rates, a central bank incorporates it with other 
policy factors that are appropriate to implement at that period. 
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Background to the study 
Monetary policy is the central banks’ activities that influence short term and long term interest rates 
(Rasche and Williams, 2005). Monetary authority, therefore, controls these interest rates by either 
supplying or removing money from its economy. Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue that if 
policymakers rely on policy rules, the subsequent result is the optimal control theory where future 
outcomes are dependent upon current and past policy decisions. This provides some information to 
agents about the changes policymakers put into action which affects their current decisions and 
expectations. Further to the information available, agents assess policymakers’ decisions that are 
implemented, as opposed to what is proposed. This creates a perception of how credible central banks 
are. Thus, the implementation of central bank's credibility places a huge influence how its monetary 
policy actions affect future variables such as long-term interest rates and other asset prices (Blinder, 
1999). 
In simple terms, the expectations hypothesis states that the current term spread between a long and 
short-term interest rate is the expected value of average future changes to the short-term interest rate 
(Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001). Through econometric studies, Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983) 
and Mankiw and Summers (1984) suggest that long rates over-react to movements in the short rate. 
This implies that the spread between the long and short rate predicts future changes in the short rate. If 
the results of the term structure contain predictive information it is said that the slope of the term 
structure may guide the monetary policy of a country (Mishkin, 1989). For instance, in the late 
1990’s, many countries adopted the inflation targeting regime where its aim is to stabilize inflation 
around a set inflation target by central banks (Mishkin, 2007). The regime is however limited by a 
stable financial market and therefore unexpected shocks may alter inflation expectations and 
effectively, interest rates. 
The use of the expectations theory of policy making is centred around three main reasons. Firstly, it 
explains how certain representations of the model change out of the sample. Secondly, a good reason 
for the use of expectation in econometric modelling is that it is a source of identifying restrictions. 
Thirdly, it places a consensus for economists who believe people will behave in their own interests 
and therefore this causes systematic and predictable deviancies (Sargent and Wallace, 1976). Such 
empirical work also implies that financial markets are efficient.  In early as 1989, Cook and Hahn 
presented evidence of the types of announcements by monetary authorities by the US signalled 
changes in the funds rates and therefore have a strong influence in long term rates.  
The bankruptcy of several investment banks bought on much financial instability. Even with the 
approach of rule-like behaviour, adverse implications revealed by the 2007/2008 US subprime crisis 
led to the recession of many economies (Blanchard et al, 2010). With the crisis, global imbalances, 
particularly in the U.S, created a global toxic combination due to the burst of the housing bubble. This 
impacted on the credibility and management of central banks. Emerging markets appeared to be 
isolated from these progressions however over time policy developments failed to extensively react to 
events bought on by the crisis (Dooley and Hutchison, 2009).  
Understanding the movements of expectations is important as it provides a basis for economists and 
others for policy decisions, investment decisions, consumer savings and other factors affecting 
economic activity. This study will try to fill the gap by examining the effects of credibility within the 
bond market. Thus, a study of how expected short interest rates are affected over varying short and 
long periods of time is investigated. The study will furthermore focus on the credibility of central 
banks in the context of emerging market economies and advanced economies by focusing on the 
relationship of current expected rates to short term rates and past expected rates 
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Problem statement  
Central bank credibility has various definitions that try to capture the functioning of central bank 
regarding monetary policy. Empirically, the expectations hypothesis has been overly accepted and 
rejected due to various reasons. To be exact, acceptance of the hypothesis has only been tested by 
authors using one country or of similar environments. In addition, to control for market expectations, 
interest rates, inflation and other variables; central banks propose long-term policies or regimes to 
control markets. Thus, how are expected rates affected over periods of regime changes?   
Since the only information available to agents are past rates and announcements, we can use them for 
to predict future rates.  Thus, we aim to validate the authenticity the hypothesis carries and therefore 
the credibility by using past long-term and short-term interest rates to substantiate the expectations 
hypothesis over a ten-year yield. In addition, by doing so we seek to capture a consensus of the bond 
market on a global scale through advanced economies and emerging market economies and seek to 
conclude a general view of the future rates of these economies  
Significance of study  
The effect of monetary policy influences the movement of interest rates to a certain degree. This 
effect depends on how closely linked short term and long term rates are to each other (Drakos, 2001). 
Much of the literature has focused on quantifying this effect especially in advanced economies such as 
the Federal Reserve.  Very little attention has been paid to study the time-varying nature of credibility 
of countries with similar market conditions. This notion also aligns with how central banks are 
credible over long periods or when a new regime is introduced. This paper aims to investigate how 
changes arising from monetary policy actions affect the bond market.  
By doing so, we may gather the credibility of various countries in the context of countries grouped as 
Advanced Market Economies (AE) and Emerging Market Economies (EME). The following AE 
countries are Canada, France, Japan, UK, and USA. The five EME’s are Greece, Israel, Mexico, 
Poland and South Africa. All these countries are chosen since the effect of the crisis is one that is 
global.  
Data and methodology 
The strategy addresses issues associated with the bond market in relation to central banks playing a role 
in controlling the market through interest rates. The approach to study makes use of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). The approach of this research will take on a deductive approach where past statistics 
and information from various published materials will aid in identifying the theories and other essential 
information which will outline a framework for testing data (Saunders, 2011).  
The study will follow a longitudinal approach where the data analysed is over a series of time studying 
the development and progress of how central banks affected the bond over time. The data uses both 
monthly long-term government bond yields (10-years) and monthly short-term government treasury 
bills. By analysing five advance economies and emerging market economies, we require countries 
which are large, fast-growing economies with some significant influence on economic affairs. Assume 
the countries share a common feature; the monetary regimes experienced which enables us to grade the 
credibility of central banks  
Research questions 
1. What is the relationship of expected rates and the spread considering ten-year long-term rates? 
2. How has the 2007/2008 subprime crisis affected the credibility of central banks? 
3. What is the effect of historical expected rates on the current expected rate? 
4. What is the long-run effect of the spread over the monetary policy regimes? 
The remainder of the paper will further contextualize credibility covered in the literature review. This 
is then followed by the research model and design. Thereafter, a presentation of the results and the 
analysis is discussed followed by a concise conclusion 
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Chapter 2: Literature review  
The role of monetary policy  
The plain role of monetary policy should be conducted in accordance with rules, where central bank 
actions influence the availability and cost of money and credit through its policies (Labonte & 
Makinen, 2008). Therefore, on the short-run, one of the main objectives of monetary policy is 
bringing inflation to a level suited to reduce interest rates and increase interest-sensitive spending 
(Labonte & Makinen, 2008). In the long run, monetary policy must keep at an inflation level that is 
constant whilst stabilizing fluctuations such as unemployment, output and other macroeconomic 
variables (Taylor, 2001).  
Monetary policy sets regimes that contain a set of rules and constraints that impact the operation of 
macroeconomic aggregates of a country (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). The three main regimes which 
has been exercised by most countries are described in the table below. A nominal anchor is a central 
feature used in monetary regimes to pin down expectations of agents about the nominal price or 
intentions of a central banks with respect to achieving a goal (Mishkin, 1999). Central banks also 
appear to prioritize when there is a need to influence market expectations. Their actions and 
announcements are implemented on a perpetual or conditional basis. For instance, the Bank of Japan 
pledged to keep its policy rate at zero but only on the condition that the economy is under deflation 
(Bernanke et al, 2004).  
Table 1 
Regime  Function Disadvantage  
Exchange-rate targeting Fixes the value of domestic 
currency to a commodity 
such as gold or to a large and 
low inflation country. 
Country’s monetary policy 
loses its autonomy and 
accountability or the country 
is too large to seek a 
currency to serve as a 
nominal anchor 
Monetary targeting focuses on the growth rate of 
a monetary aggregate. Also, 
it enables a 
central bank to adjust its 
monetary policy to cope with 
domestic considerations 
unlike exchange-rate 
targeting  
Depends on if the targeted 
aggregate is well controlled 
by the central bank. Also, 
depends on if the there is a 
strong relation between the 
goal variable and targeted 
aggregate.  
Inflation targeting Concentrates on actively 
shaping and targeting 
inflation expectations 
involving several essentials 
such as public 
announcement, transparency, 
credibility etc.  
The effect of inflation 
targeting is more 
ambiguous. Inflation 
expectations may not adjust 
immediately. Policymakers 
are forced to be forward 
looking rather than on 
current conditions  
(Mishkin, 1999) 
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Theories supporting the impact of policy to the bond market  
Monetary policy relies on several theories to create a dynamic interrelationship. This means the 
economy being able to be flexible enough to adjust for and to live up to being credible for its policies 
implemented. Therefore, a balance between flexibility and credibility must be maintained to for 
progressive economic activity. Theoretically, we may look at how this relationship is built which will 
be discussed below 
In a mathematical expression, the expectations hypothesis states that the anticipated holding yield for 
bonds of different maturities should be the same, except for a risk premium (Bulkley et al, 2008). This 
implies that the term structure contains further information, the term premium. Theoretically, the 
expectation hypothesis is not viewed in isolation. Some authors view it as the joint hypothesis where 
investors’ rational expectations conform to expectations hypothesis (Froot, 1989). 
The difference in long rate and short interest rate is called the spread. The spread is used to reflect the 
predictive information in the term structure and reflects the expected changes in the short rate 
(Mankiw and Miron, 1986). The yield is also the slope coefficient and measures the degree or extent 
how central banks are credible at that period. Theoretically, the coefficient equals to one (McCallum, 
1994). This is due to large asymptotic standard errors to finite-sample bias (McCallum, 1994). 
However, empirically, the slope coefficient tends to be below one.   
A high yield spread forecasts rising short term rates. An understanding of a high yield spread implies 
short term rates tend to rise over the life of the long-term rates (Campbell and Shiller, 1991). 
Concurrently, when the yield spread is high and the yield on the long-term rate tends to fall over the 
life of the shorter-term bond, this contradicts the expectations hypothesis (Campbell and Shiller, 
1991). This implies central banks tightening the supply of money leading to a rise in interest rates in 
the short run. In addition, given a central bank is credible, longer term rates tend to rise less than short 
term rates and the spread between these rates declines. This results to the yield curve flattening. The 
movement between the short rate and long rate exhibiting the yield spread over a span of fifteen years 
is shown in the illustrations in figure1 and figure 2  
The term premium is the surplus rate that compensates risk averse investors (Dziwura and Green, 
1996). Generally, the term premium accounts for uncertainty such as inflation and real activity 
amongst many other factors (Kim and Orphanides, 2007). Literature has explained that the nature of 
the term premium is time-varying because the risk is owing to unexpected interest rate movements 
(Engle et al, 1987).  
For a successful monetary policy, monetary authorities must have an accurate timing and effect of 
policies on the economy. The transmission mechanism is the process through which monetary policy 
decisions triggers changes such as real GDP and inflation (Taylor, 1995). These mechanisms include 
interest rate effects, exchange rate effects and other asset price effects and the credit channel. An 
understanding of the transmission mechanism allows monetary authorities to determine many the 
factors appropriate for policy building to implement in different business cycles and the trade-off 
choice between the macroeconomic variables (Taylor, 1995). Therefore, the optimal rule as 
mentioned earlier, provides a foundation for the various frameworks transmission mechanism used by 
central banks  
The hypothesis is also accustomed, as described by Muth (1961), on the following three factors 1. 
Information is scarce which agents do not waste 2. When expectations are formed, it depends on the 
structure of a relevant system best describing the economy 3. A public prediction, described by 
Grunberg and Modigliani (1954) has no substantial effect on the operation of the economic system. 
The reflection of market participants is the slope of the yield curve, the spread between long rates and 
short rates 
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Figure 1: Interest rate spreads of Advanced Market Economies  
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Evidence on the succession and failure of the expectation hypothesis  
Over time empirical literature has either rejected or accepted the expectations hypothesis for various 
reasons. This is due to some factors influencing the term structure. Most are traditional however, 
studies find a variety of implications relating to the hypothesis. Some factors are due to the changing 
nature that central banks impose. For instance, many papers have tested the authenticity of the 
hypothesis on post-war data between three-month and six-month treasury bills and have found no 
information proving the spread contains forecasting abilities (Rudebusch, 1995). Several papers have 
also rejected the notion that the spread contains projecting information to forecast changes in interest 
rates. Mankiw and Miron (1986) proved that the predictive power was not due to the failure of the 
expectations theory. The failure was rather because the Fed implemented measures to stabilize short 
term rates thereby influencing the way interest rates moved 
Many authors such as Mankiw and Summers (1984), Mankiw and Miron (1986) and Campbell and 
Shiller (1991) also revealed that the spread of the term structure moves in the wrong direction due to 
the change of the long rate (Hardouvelis, 1994). However, it was also found that long rates obey the 
direction of the expectations but movements of the long rate are sluggish relative to the movement of 
the short rate (Hardouvelis, 1994). Correspondingly, the slope forecasts long term changes in the 
direction of short rates (Bekaert et al, 1997).  
Many studies have observed United States (U.S) data in testing the validity of the hypothesis and find 
to reject it. However other studies find outside the U.S the behaviour of short rates conforms to the 
hypothesis such as Canada. A study using Canadian data found the hypothesis is not rejected for most 
maturities across the money market forward term structure (Paquette and Stréliski, 1998). Many 
authors are also unable to prove to reject the hypothesis due to the term premia or an expectational 
error present. It was found that the term premia are biased towards shorter term instruments and the 
expectational error is more biased to the predictability of the spread (Froot, 1989). Other reasons are 
due to the interest rate spread prediction; where it does not predict the direction of changes in long 
term rates and future changes in the short rate is often not correlated with the spread (Campbell and 
Shiller, 1991)  
The study of the expectations hypothesis has gone deeper due to Campbell and Shiller (1991). Their 
findings conclude that any pair of maturities making the yield, fails to predict the movement of long 
rates but can forecast short rates. The failure of the expectations hypothesis is also due to the 
behaviour of the error term. In addition, by using current and lagged short rates data, their results 
presented the failure of the hypothesis because of the error term. During the period 1952-1987, the 
paper proved the correlation of the yield spread and past short rates failed to accept the expectations 
hypothesis (Campbell and Shiller, 1991).  
Some research has however not accepted the rejection of the expectation hypothesis from previous 
literature. The impression of Campbell and Shiller (1991) finds anomalies of expectations hypothesis 
which has sparked the rejection by many authors. However, other authors argue market participants 
restore bond yields to equilibrium values required by the hypothesis showing consistent results thus 
disputing the animality present in the hypothesis (Bulkley et al, 2008).  
The expectations hypothesis has been empirically rejected by researchers such as (Roll, 1970; 
Campbel and Shiller, 1991; Sarno et al, 2007; Buser et al. (1996), Bekaert et al. (1997), Balduzzi et al. 
(1997), and Backus et al. (1998). The key rejections are well elaborated by Berkaert and Hodrick, 
(2001) are as follows. The first rejection is that hypothesis justifies its assumption of rational 
expectations and unlimited arbitrage. This implies rational investors profit from the forecasting errors 
estimated by irrational investors. The second rejection is the existence of time-varying risk premiums. 
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This means standard tests of the hypothesis neglect variables accounting the risk premium unless if 
the variables are correlated with the interest rates.  Thirdly, the test itself may contain poor properties 
leading to fabricated rejections in finite samples. This could be caused by highly persistent variable, 
measurement error etc.    
As one of the functions of central banks is to supply money to the economy, the relationship between 
money supply and expected rates is puzzling. This is because money, prices, interest rates and 
monetary policy are all endogenous (Cornell, 1983). Findings empirically have found to be 
ambiguous (Cornell, 1983). This is due to the constraints on whether markets are efficient and uses all 
information available in assessing the movements of interest rates. In hindsight, since markets react 
efficiently to available information, the response of expected rates to money supply can however be 
biased on unanticipated announcements (Mishkin, 1982). Therefore, the general view of an 
unanticipated increase in money stock, leads to an unanticipated decline in short rates (Mishkin, 
1982).  
Testing the credibility of central banks employs linear models through using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and carry certain provisions before considering evaluating credibility. Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(1985) modelled interest rates that allowed for desirable properties the properties are 1. Interest rates 
should be non-negative; 2 they are mean reverting; 3. Heteroskedastic, i.e. variance increases with 
mean; 4. Interest rates at adjacent points in time are correlated (Aag, 2006). To account for the 
presence of autocorrelation, autoregressive models are used to approximate autocorrelation at higher 
orders  
Coefficient stability tests are conducted to interpret the stationarity of the interest rate carries. The 
primary purpose of the test must interpret whether the spread is unbiased to predict the changes of 
expected interest rate. Therefore, variables expressing the expected rate must be stationary. Also, if 
the spread is stationary, the relationship between long and short rates are said to be co-integrated 
(King and Kurmann, 2002). A more powerful test of co-integration is the vector auto-regression 
(VAR) process. This rigorous test will however not be conducted since the spread is component of the 
hypothesis and not the whole model which we are focused on  
The expected rate is dependent on the short interest rate to capture the predictive power also, when 
testing the forecast power of the rates uses the changes in rates rather than the level of rates as it 
removes potential bias in regression (Fama, 1984). A major rule to note is that the predictive value 
should be significantly different from zero. Otherwise a value closer to zero suggests that the rate has 
no predictive power.  
It is said that regression tests are vastly biased in samples (Bekaert et al,1997). In the case of interest 
rates, the presence of autocorrelation is detected making it unfavourable to entirely accept the 
predictive power of the spread as it produces biased results towards the spread (Steeley, 2008). The 
Durbin-Watson (DW) detects autocorrelation to measure smoothness and measures long-term 
business conditions (Fama, 1984). If the autocorrelation is positive, the curve may be too stiff and if 
negative, the curve may be too flexible (Steeley, 2008) Therefore, autocorrelation must decay to avoid 
a biased measure.   
The behaviour of interest rates at different points change over time based on their conditions due to 
extreme volatility within the market or the variance of the series the change in the policy regime and 
so on. Much literature assumes that short rates follow an autoregressive progress with the possibility 
of conditional heteroskedastic errors (Pfann et al, 1996). These changes must therefore be captured 
through autoregressive (AR) models. Where a linear stationary autoregressive process permits, long 
term expectations converge around a constant mean (Dewachter and Lyrio, 2008). Furthermore, 
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empirically market perception of expected rates follows an AR (1) model process that can explicitly 
model higher moments of the stochastic process which is the weighted average of conditional 
variance (Johannes, 2004). The AR model is also used to compute discount bonds based on a 
stochastic short interest rate in such a way where there are no arbitrage opportunities (Ho and Lee, 
1986). 
Recent impact of monetary policy on bond market  
What led to the failure of the recent global financial crisis?  How did it affect both the advanced and 
emerging market economies? This discussion will provide a literary standpoint of occurrences 
affecting the bond market in relation to monetary policy over time by highlighting major events that 
led to the crisis and its subsequent effect.  Therefore, this will discuss and highlight major years of the 
bond market pre, during and post the impacting the financial crisis.  Most events are relating to the US 
dollar long-term rates are susceptible to global shocks (Sobrun & Turner, 2015).   
To start, huge money injections had been made despite the low historical interest rates in the 1980’s. 
In mid-2002, the U.S aggressively lowered the Federal rate from 6,5% to 1% over 2001 to 2003 
(Agbetsiafa, 2011). This fuelled lower housing rates in the economy and encouraged the accumulation 
of U.S assets in large volumes from developing countries. This allowed U.S to thrive through this 
period and stimulate growth in other countries (Agbetsiafa, 2011). However, this risk-taking effort 
was short-lived after the unsustainable US housing prices burst and sub-prime mortgage markets 
showed significant losses in value. In UK, the rates also lowered down to 2% and near zero for 
Germany (Boero & Torricelli, 2002). Japanese sovereign yields have been low throughout the period 
from around 2% in 1997 to zero leaving little room to further reduce its short rate (Bean et al, 2015).  
In 2007, many researchers and economists developed a view that the collapse of the credit mechanism 
was bought by massive banking failures. Where financial uncertainty is high and the bond market is 
illiquid, a high-risk premium transpires reducing the expectations mechanism (Cukierman, 2013).  
The impact of low interest rate environment bought several changes with regards to inflation and bond 
markets. This implication was demonstrated in 2008 through the Lehman bankruptcy, the AIG bailout 
and other related events which almost brought down the financial system. The U.S economy seemed 
to have interest rates that are negative in real terms after taking inflation into account. If the interest 
rate fall below zero central banks face a challenge in stabilizing the economy. 
In the context of emerging markets, a study was conducted for emerging market bonds and revealed 
many characteristics impacting on emerging markets due to the financial crisis. It was found that 
during this period, the correlation between emerging and developed markets was cyclical but negative 
to stabilize the exchange rate by changing the interest rate to help stabilize inflation (Klau and 
Mohanty, 2004). Where the exchange rate depreciates and the economy chooses to absorb the 
depreciation, this affects increasing the inflation rate leading to a decrease in credibility (Klau and 
Mohanty, 2004). For instance, in Brazil, inflation rates increased due to currency pressures over 
different periods all due to external pressures.  
Emerging market economies was not fully affected by the crisis (Frank & Hesse, 2009). There were 
however financial spill-overs which resulted in emerging markets facing real sector problems and 
these economies suffered within their domestic industrial production and GDP growth (Frank and 
Hesse, 2009). The extent of the spill-over is due to interbank pressure from the Libor-Overnight 
Indexed Swap (OIS) and bank solvency from Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spread had become more 
correlated with emerging market bond, stock and credit markets (Frank and Hesse, 2009). This 
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became more evident in the beginning of the crisis and in the event where Bear Stearns rescued the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Frank and Hesse, 2009)  
The crisis has shown how banking system failures can lead to tightening conditions and the need for 
government intervention in some countries. In response to the crisis, many advanced economies seek 
for unconventional monetary policy such as quantitative easing. The aim of quantitative easing is to 
inject money into the economy by making large scale purchases thereby increasing nominal spending 
and reducing long term rates (Joyce et al, 2011). The purchases operate to reduce rates of different 
maturities while the short rate is at a zero-bound rate (Curdia et al, 2012). However, this has led to the 
rebalancing of the portfolio model (Joyce et al, 2011). Other channels have been affected by 
quantitative easing such as the signalling channel it affects interest rates directly in lowering shorter 
maturity rates and the liquidity channel where long-term securities are purchased and increasing 
reserve balances to increase the liquidity of investor and thereby decrease the liquidity premium 
(Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011) 
Large-scale purchases include the Federal Reserve purchasing a total of $1.75 trillion of mortgage-
backed securities, agency debt and treasuries in early 2009 (Curdia et al, 2012). In mid-2009, the 
European Central bank purchased a total of €60 billion of bonds in Euro areas (Curdia et al, 2012). 
The Bank of Japan established an asset purchase program where ¥5 trillion of assets were purchased 
(Curdia et al, 2012). Generally, the purchase is over four quarters which holds the balance sheet 
constant for the coming two years before it gradually winds down over the additional two years 
(Curdia et al, 2012). Policymakers may change this length depending on economic conditions. The 
response on macroeconomic variables particularly as GDP and inflation is strong. The result is an 
inflation response that is twice as large relative to the crisis and GDP being stronger but with on the 
enhancement to the GDP level (Curdia et al, 2012).  
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Chapter 3: Research model and design  
The expectations hypothesis model was much progressed by Campbell and Shiller in 1991. In this 
framework, the long-term rates depend on the current short-term interest rate and on future short term 
interest rate.  Letting  𝑅 𝑡 denote the long-term rate and 𝑟 𝑡 denote current short rates, we can present 
the model as follows:  
𝑅𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
𝑟𝑡 +
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐸𝑡𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                           (1) 
where 𝑟𝑡+𝑗 serves to capture economic agents’ expectations about short-term rates and n represents 
the time frame of the term structure. We can rearrange equation (1) to obtain the difference between 
the long rate and short rate and define the yield spread as: 
𝑅𝑡 −  
1
𝑛
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑒                                                                                    (2)  
Where 𝑟𝑡
𝑒 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  as shown in (1), the change in the expected short rate. It posits that the 
change in the expected short rate is related to the slope of the yield curve represented as 𝛽 (Mankiw 
and Miron, 1986). The null hypothesis 𝛽 should be greater than zero but less than one. This indicates 
the degree of credibility of that a central bank possesses as shown below (Dziwum & Green, 1996). 
The term 𝜀𝑡 is the white noise error process where 𝜀𝑡 = 𝜌𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑣 such that 𝜀𝑣 ∼ (0, 𝛿𝑣
2). 
𝑟𝑡
𝑒 =∝ + 𝛽𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡;   𝛽 > 0                                                                    (3) 
Thereafter, the subsequent purpose would be to observe the response of the current expected rate 
based on previous interest rates. We first observe the relation by lagging the short rate as shown 
below in equation (4). This equation is still basis that 𝛽 > 0 should still hold even with the lagged 
variable 
𝑟𝑡
𝑒 =∝ + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑟𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡; 
𝑛
𝑗=0
       ∑ 𝛽 > 0                         (4) 
𝑛
𝑗=0
 
As credibility still holds even with the lag, we now test whether previous expected rates and the short 
rate prove still carries information which the current expected rate may respond to. Therefore,  
𝑟𝑡𝑒 =∝ + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑟𝑡−1−𝑗
𝑒 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑟𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0
+ 𝜖𝑡 
𝑚
𝑖=1
                    (5) 
We then analyse how expected short rates responds when central banks alter the supply of money 
which could be caused by unanticipated shocks within the economy. We introduce the impact of the 
change in money supply and its previous expected rate as a function of the current expected rate. The 
equation thus is modelled as 
𝑟𝑡
𝑒 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗𝑟𝑡−1−𝑗
𝑒
𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ∑ ɤ𝑗∆𝑚𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
ɤ=0
+ 𝜀𝑡                                            (6) 
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Chapter 4: Results and analysis  
Data  
All data used in this paper is extracted from St.  Louis Fed. The models are tested by using monthly 
data of the interest rates of treasury bill and ten-year long-term government bonds from 2000M01 to 
2015M12. For the sake of simplicity, the monthly data therefore is divided into periods before 
(2000M06 to 2006M12), during (2007M01 to 2009M12) and after (2010M01 to 2015M02) the 
financial crisis. In later stages, the board money supply (M3) is used. It is important to note that the 
use of the data is in conjunction with the desirable properties expressed by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
(1985). Through much econometric substantiation, credibility and money supply are regressed for 
interpretation 
Since the paper focuses on ten-year long rate, the short rate is therefore multiplied by this factor. This 
is time frame of the term structure had been defined earlier as n.  Primarily it is imperative to conduct 
stationarity tests of the short rate, long rate and expected rate variables. The regression uses changes 
in rates opposed to the actual rates to remove potential bias in regression results. Standard unit root 
process tests the long rate, short rate and expected rate series by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test. The null hypothesis of the ADF states a unit root process present. The test is accompanied 
with the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. Further, KPSS is used because of the 
criticism that ADF tests sometimes misinterprets unit roots with low powers or values with a root 
close to the non-stationary boundary. In the case of KPSS, the null hypothesis states a stationary 
process is present. Hence ADF and KPSS contain null hypothesis in contradiction to each other. In 
this way, testing for stationarity of the series using both ADF and KPSS can, by default prove the 
series to be precisely stationary  
Table 2 and table 3 presents results of the ADF and KPSS tests respectively. The variables are proven 
to be stationary unless otherwise stated by an asterix placed to indicate at which level of significance 
to reject. A theoretical finding is greater negative values of the ADF test. A series strongly rejects the 
hypothesis of a unit root proving a greater effect towards stationarity. In addition, the expected rates 
are more negative than the other rates. This effect could be attested to its linear dependency on the 
long and short rate.  
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
 Short rate Long rate Expected rate 
Advanced Market 
Economy  
   
Canada -11.09 -11.44 -11.31 
France -6.06 -18.24 -19.06 
Japan -9.41 -12.19 -18.23 
United Kingdom -21.19 -16.933 -17.24 
United States -4.47 -4.47 -11.2 
    
Emerging Market 
Economy  
   
Greece -8.88 -12.12 -12.14 
Israel -8.90 -10.40 -10.77 
Mexico -6.14 -10.15 -10.61 
Poland -7.53 -8.27 -6.83 
South Africa -14.53 -17.59 -17.97 
Notes: unit root testing from 2000 through 2015. The t-statistics of the coefficients are in parenthesis. A *, **, *** denotes 
rejection at a 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level. The null hypothesis of the test is of a unit root process 
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Table 3: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
 Short rate Long rate Expected rate 
Advanced    
Canada -12.45 -15.68 -16.05 
France 0.04 0.23 0.26 
Japan 0.04 0.09 0.11 
United Kingdom 0.09 0.33 0.24 
United States 0.13 0.07 0.05**, *** 
    
Emerging    
Greece 0.739**,*** 0.10 0.09 
Israel 0.12 0.25 0.33 
Mexico 0.14 0.04 0.03 
Poland 0.40*** 0.122 0.14 
South Africa 0.09 0.35*** 0.30 
Notes: unit root testing from 2000 through 2015. The t-statistics of the coefficients are in parenthesis. A *, **, *** denotes 
rejection at a 1, 5, and 10 percent significance level. The null hypothesis of the test is of a stationary process 
The next model tests the expected rate to the coefficient which is the spread. The null hypothesis must 
prove𝛽 > 0 It, is to test the predictive power of the spread i.e.: coefficient stability tests. Table 4 and 
table 5 present the results. The results are all below one. Findings in most countries exhibits that the 
coefficient on the short rates is positive and significant. This proves that we may accept the null 
hypothesis that the predictability of the spread is greater than zero i.e.: 𝛽 > 0. This further contributes 
to the property provided by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) where interest rates should be non-
negative. To be exact, most economies present the impact of the crisis as credibility is weakened 
during this period (2007-2009). This change in the predictive power is the stochastic nature of the 
crisis. This is likewise as in Mankiw and Miron (1986) who speculate in the founding of the Federal 
Reserve bank presented a random walk behaviour which weakened its predictive power (i.e.: 
credibility). 
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Table 4: null hypothesis results for advanced market economy 
Period Country Constant coefficient 𝑅2 DW 
2000M01-2006M12 Canada 0.04 
(19.49) 
0.54 
(3.25) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
0.08 
2007M01-2009M12  0.03 
(46.43) 
0.17 
(7.04) 
0.59 
0.58 
0.35 
2011M07-2015M02  0.01 
(2.77) 
0.80 
(1.60) 
0.01 
(-0.009) 
0.09 
2000M01-2006M12 France 0.03 
(17.26) 
0.45 
(9.08) 
0.50 
(0.52) 
0.11 
2007M01-2009M12  0.03 
(60.26) 
0.11 
(5.99) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
0.80 
2010M01-2015M02  0.02 
(24.11) 
1.74 
(7.56) 
0.53 
(0.53) 
0.7 
2000M01-2006M12 Japan 0.01 
(39.92) 
-8.99 
(-45.26) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.27 
2007M01-2009M12  0.01 
(21.45) 
-9.39 
(-79.43) 
0.99 
(0.99) 
0.91 
2010M-2014M09  0.003 
(4.65) 
-3.15 
(-4.84) 
0.30 
(0.29) 
0.74 
2000M01-2006M12 UK 0.04 
(15.98) 
0.18 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.13) 
0.19 
2007M01-2009M12  0.04 
(55.28) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
0.77 
(0.77) 
0.89 
2010M-2015M02  0.004 
(1.35) 
5.76 
(0.64) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
 
2000M01-2006M12 USA 0.04 
(37.04) 
0.2 
(0.03) 
0.35 
(0.34) 
0.21 
2007M01-2009M12  0.03 
(42.67) 
0.23 
(8.27) 
0.66 
(0.66) 
0.71 
2011M01-2015M02  0.02 
(15.66) 
-0.35 
(2.67) 
0.0005 
(-0.02) 
0.122 
Notes: tests of credibility are divided into intervals of 2000-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2015 in each country.  Constant and the short rate are report with its corresponding t-
statistics in parenthesis. 𝑅2 is reported with its adjusted 𝑅2 below in parenthesis. Durbin-Watson stat is denoted as DW 
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Table 5: null hypothesis results for emerging market economy  
Period Country Constant Coefficient 𝑅2 DW 
2000M01-2006M12 Greece 0.03 
(33.64) 
0.28 
(10.98) 
0.60 
(0.59) 
0.10 
2007M01-2009M12  0.05 
(33.13) 
-0.21 
(-5.05) 
0.43 
(0.41) 
0.35 
2010M02-2015M02  0.09 
(7.71) 
5.42 
(3.55) 
0.18 
(0.16) 
0.14 
2000M01-2006M12 Israel 0.06 
(10.55) 
0.05 
(0.512) 
0.003 
(-0.009) 
0.08 
2007M01-2009M12  0.05 
(41.50) 
0.08 
(2.26) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.59 
2010M02-2015M02  0.03 
(20.42) 
0.76 
(11.02) 
0.67 
(0.67) 
0.12 
2000M01-2006M12 Mexico 0.07 
(12.93) 
0.18 
(2.30) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.32 
2007M01-2009M12  0.07 
(12.46) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(-0.04) 
1.63 
2010M02-2015M02  0.04 
(6.17) 
0.35 
(0.18) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.56 
2001M01-2006M12 Poland 0.03 
(17.71) 
0.42 
(0.02) 
0.89 
(0.89) 
0.23 
2007M01-2009M10  0.04 
(17.97) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.32 
2010M-2015M02  0.004 
(0.32) 
1.15 
(0.37) 
0.36 
(0.33) 
0.09 
2000M01-2006M12 South Africa 0.04 
(4.79) 
0.58 
(0.09) 
0.33 
(0.32) 
0.052 
2007M01-2009M12  0.08 
(10.55) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
0.00008 
(-0.03) 
0.27 
2010M-2015M01  
 
0.05 
(8.77) 
0.50 
(5.07) 
0.30 
(0.29) 
0.36 
Notes: tests of credibility are divided into intervals of 2000-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2015 in each country.  Constant and the short rate are report with its corresponding t-
statistics in parenthesis. 𝑅2 is reported with its adjusted 𝑅2 below in parenthesis. Durbin-Watson stat is denoted as DW 
  1 
Another outcome occurs in the case of Japan (2000-2015), USA (from 2011-2015) Greece (from 
2011-2015) and Mexico (from 2007-2009) as its coefficient is less than zero. We thus fail to accept 
the hypothesis in this instance. The negative coefficient in these cases occur in periods where interest 
rates were tending toward a period of the zero lower bound. These are also at points where the events 
of the financial crisis had occurred. However, Japan presents a negative coefficient from the recent 
crisis and in its circumstance of the liquidity trap caused by the collapse of its financial institutions. 
The trap bought a spiral in events of deflation and yet a closer look for modern monetary policy 
resolution giving rise to quantitative easing. The effect of quantitative easing is strongly evident post 
crisis as credibility strengthened when large injections of money stimulated nominal spending. 
Credibility in the beginning is low and the value continues to decrease during the period of the crisis. 
The negative coefficient however weakens post the storm of crisis and Japan’s efforts into 
quantitative easing presented a more strengthened magnitude of credibility.  
R-squared statistics explains the fit of the short rate is to predict the expected rate. The adjusted R-
squared appear to further support the predictable power of short rates. Both the R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared are found to be lower in emerging market economies than advanced economies.  
A reason for the low values of R-squared in emerging economies is the objectives of central banks 
during the crisis. Emerging economies suffered financial spill overs from the crisis as opposed to 
advanced economies where they primarily faced liquidity difficulties. The spill-over initiated bank 
and currency problems resulting to increased inflation 
As table 4 and table 5 present equation (3), it has proven that the expected rate is dependent on the 
current short rate and justifies the credibility of central banks changes before and during and after the 
crisis. If the expected rate is dependent on current short rates, we further question if previous short-
rates can also interpret the null hypothesis of credibility over the same period (2000-2015) without the 
ramifications stated above (i.e.: negative coefficient). Thus, the short rates are lagged as in equation 
(4) and results are presented in table 6 and table 7 
Results given in equation (4) show that past short rates do contain explanatory influence on the 
expected short rate. This is evident as the coefficient of the short rates in all countries tested remain 
greater than zero as the null hypothesis states. In addition, the probability of the lags in each country 
proves to be significant.  
The null hypothesis of credibility is not true for Japan. The coefficients of the lagged short rate still 
produce a negative coefficient value at their respective significance values.  The same deduction of 
zero lower bound still justifies for the negative coefficient. Although, the Federal Reserve Bank and 
the Bank of England had reached its zero lower bound, the overall power of credibility is weaker than 
France and Canada. A reason to a weaker level of credibility could be due to the crisis primarily 
existing around these countries. Where interest rates are close or within the proximity of the zero-
bound region, a high reliance of government intervention and unconventional policy is interjected 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) detects autocorrelation at the first level testing for first order serial 
correlation and the linear association between the residuals of the regression (Stešević, 2008).  Values 
describe either a positive or negative autocorrelation. The results in equation (4) all display a positive 
value close to zero indicating autocorrelation. Thus, the increase of the independent variable may lead 
to an increase in the dependent variable leading to a misinterpretation or biased interpretation of the 
results. As mentioned empirically regarding interest rates, DW construes long term business 
conditions. Therefore, the interpretation of the results given for equation (4) is biased toward long-
term conditions as the spread is a function of the long-term rate. Due to this indication, the results lead 
to a biased reaction toward the expected rate results of equation (4) 
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Table 6: effect of lagging short rates in advanced economy 
Canada 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.024 0.0000 
RSTCAN (-1) 0.53 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.52 
(0.52) 
 
DW   
France 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.025 0.0000 
RSTFRA (-1) 0.48 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.65 
(0.64) 
 
DW 0.1  
Japan 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.010863 0.0000 
RSTJPN (-2) -7.213624 0.0000 
RSTJPN (-2) -1.549620 0.0353 
R 
Adj R 
0.88 
(0.88) 
 
DW 1.33  
UK 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.026793 0.0000 
RSTUK (-1) 0.351434 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
  
DW   
USA 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.029 0.0000 
RSTUSA (-1) 0.40 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.67 
(0.67) 
 
DW 0.1  
Notes: the data is presented as follows RST represents the short rate followed by an abbreviation or acronym 
of the name of the country. This also follows the numbers in lags. R-squared is denoted as R and its adjusted 
𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is the Durbin-Watson  
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Table 7: effect of lagging short rate in emerging market economy  
 
Notes: the data is presented as follows RST represents the short rate followed by an abbreviation or 
acronym of the name of the country. This also follows the numbers in lags. R-squared is denoted as R 
and its adjusted 𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is the Durbin-Watson  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.098826 0.0000 
RSTGR (-1) -1.032574 0.0000 
RSTGR (-1) 0.098826 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.18 
(0.17) 
 
DW 0.08  
Israel 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.039192 0.0000 
RSTI (-1) 1.012325 0.0005 
RSTI (-2) -0.631562 0.0265 
R 
Adj R 
0.37 
(0.36) 
 
DW 0.13  
Mexico 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.041032 0.0000 
RSTMEX (-1) 0.545123 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.52 
(0.52) 
 
DW 0.29  
Poland 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.033837 0.0000 
RSTPOL (-1) 0.374978 0.0000 
   
R 
Adj R 
0.84 
(0.84) 
 
DW 0.26  
South Africa 
Variable Coefficient probability 
Constant 0.054064 0.0000 
Lag 1 0.380694 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.28 
(0.27) 
 
DW 0.07  
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equation (3) and (4) has proven the null hypothesis that short rates over short intervals (i.e.: before, 
during and after) and its lagged short interest rate can measure the credibility of central banks. 
However, the empirical problem of positive autocorrelation is still present amongst the results. Also, 
the models presented justify its consistency to measure credibility and how it responds to the impact 
of the financial crisis in the period of one regime. Yet, is the measure of central bank credibility still 
precise over different regimes presented by central banks? Equation (5) examines this matter.  
We seek to understand the effect of credibility spanning over different regimes by analysing the how 
current expected rates are affected by its past expected rates and short rates. Correspondingly where 
the problem of autocorrelation is present, it necessary to rectify and to remove the biased relationship 
of the long-term effects with expected rates. As pointed out by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985), auto-
regression is used to remove the effects of autocorrelation. A linear stationary autoregressive process 
allows one to interpret higher moments of long term expectations to converge around a constant mean 
(Aag, 2006). Equation (5) is thus a relationship that proves to find how historic expected rates 
together with the short rate affect the current or future expected rate  
The data is regressed from the period of monetary targeting to inflationary targeting. Majority of the 
countries resulted a significant combination of short interest rates and the auto-regressed process 
lagged once. In the results presented, observing the Durbin-Watson values of each country show a 
result to values closer to two. This implies the effects of autocorrelation from previous models have 
decayed. The decay, attributable to auto-regression. The fact that the combination of these variables 
over the regimes are significant, we may accept the relationship as a sound measure over different 
regimes with accurate of autocorrelation and the lag in the short rate  
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Table 8: effect of past expected rates in advanced market economy  
Canada 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001416 0.0000 
RET (1) 1.247393 0.0000 
RET (2) -0.294751 0.0000 
RSTCAN (-1) 0.030071 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.90  
France 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.000907 0.0005 
RET (1) 1.163835 0.0000 
RET (2) -0.197053 0.0000 
RSTFRA (-1) 0.023675 0.0003 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.99  
Japan 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.006681 0.0000 
RET (1) 0.520359 0.0000 
RSTJPN (-1) -4.274226 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 2.76  
United Kingdom 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.000925 0.0033 
RET (1) 1.260390 0.0000 
RET (2) -0.304541 0.0000 
RSTUK (-1) 0.033775 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.86  
United States of America   
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001138 0.0003 
RET (1) 1.256274 0.0000 
RET (2) -0.298678 0.0000 
RSTUSA (-1) 0.029196 0.0001 
R 
Adj R 
0.96 
(0.96) 
 
DW 1.94  
Notes: the data is presented as follows RST represents the short rate followed by an abbreviation or 
acronym of the name of the country. This also follows the numbers of lags RET is the auto-regression 
process expected short rate. R-squared is denoted as R and its adjusted 𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is 
the Durbin-Watson  
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Table 9: effect of past expected rates in emerging market economy 
 
Notes: the data is presented as follows RST represents the short rate followed by an abbreviation or 
acronym of the name of the country. This also follows the numbers of lags RET is the auto-regression 
process expected short rate. R-squared is denoted as R and its adjusted 𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is 
the Durbin-Watson  
 
 
Greece 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001484 0.4220 
RET (1) 0.974701 0.0000 
RSTGR (-1) 0.007897 0.7335 
R 
Adj R 
0.95 
(0.95) 
 
DW 1.77  
Israel 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001607 0.0379 
RET (1) 0.977468 0.0000 
RSTI (-1) -0.007618 0.1705 
R 
Adj R 
0.96 
(0.96) 
 
DW 1.40  
Mexico 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.005100 0.1319 
RSTMEX (-1) 0.078854 0.0270 
AR (1) 0.670075 0.0000 
AR (2) 0.202389 0.0381 
R 
Adj R 
0.87 
(0.87) 
 
DW 1.74  
Poland 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.006246 0.0000 
RSTPOL (-1) 0.072423 0.0000 
AR (1) 1.289576 0.0000 
AR (2) -0.475212 0.0000 
R 
Adj R 
0.97 
(0.97) 
 
DW 2.08  
South Africa 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001093 0.0188 
RET (1) 1.264519 0.0000 
RET (2) -0.294358 0.0000 
RSTSA (-1) 0.020405 0.0000 
C 0.001093 0.0188 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.94  
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What happens to the effect of credibility when central banks add or remove its own currency to the 
economy? How does it affect the expected rate over the regime changes introduced by central banks? 
Equation (6) explains the questions at hand.  The board money supply is introduced to express the 
supply or removal of money to the economy. Historical expected rates are also used to account for 
previous expectations thus carrying some explanatory power for the current expected rate, it is also 
applied to equation 6.  
The money supply measured in this paper is the supply of money which includes currency in 
circulation, short-term deposits in banks and money market funds of a maturity of less than twenty-
four-hours and longer-term time deposits and money market funds with a maturity greater than 24 
hours. The is sourced as the log difference of money supply to remove remain within the parameters 
of computing non-negative values. The period runs from 1975 to 2015 however in some countries, the 
data is not fully supplied to that extent. Therefore, we consider the period over a minimum of a 
regime change between the current and one which was previously implemented. The objective of this 
model is to evaluate whether there is a significant impact of money supply to expected short rates. 
The results are presented in table 10 and table 11 
The results presented in tables 10 and 11 examine the impact of money supply to expected rates. The 
implication of the money supply present coefficients with probabilities that are insignificant. The DW 
is still held at values close to two which imply no presence of auto-correlation. The R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared as mentioned above, is the proportion of variation of the actual yield changes. In 
the results, the R-squared and adjusted R-squared still hold  
Money supply is insignificants to expected rates. This implies the role market efficiency plays with 
the information available where it can expect the circulation of money supply. As discussed earlier, 
the variables expected rates and money supply are endogenous and thus its significance to 
predictability is ambiguous.  
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Table 10: effect of money supply in advanced market economy 
Notes: the data is presented as follows RET represents the lagged expected short rate. DLMS is the log 
difference of money supply followed by an abbreviation or acronym of the name of the country. R-
squared is denoted as R and its adjusted 𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is the Durbin-Watson  
 
 
 
 
Canada 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C -0.000480 0.1687 
RET (-1) 0.995776 0.0000 
DLMSCAN (-1) 0.007742 0.0034 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.45  
France 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 5.47E-05 0.9363 
RET (-1) 1.170651 0.0000 
RET (-2) -0.177697 0.0063 
DLMSFRA (-1) 0.005790 0.4053 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 2.008  
Japan 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.000080 0.9453 
RET (-1) 1.004993 0.0000 
DLMSJPN (-1) 0.000190 0.8783 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 2.10  
United Kingdom 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C -6.75E-05 0.8223 
RET (-1) 1.293414 0.0000 
RET (-2) -0.448261 0.0000 
RET (-3) 0.145298 0.0086 
DLMSUK (-1) 0.005090 0.0369 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.98  
United States of America 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C -0.000190 0.6091 
RET (-1) 0.993975 0.0000 
DLMSUSA (-1) 0.007921 0.0552 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.44  
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Table 11: effect of money supply in emerging market economy 
Greece 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.003829 0.0260 
RET (-1) 0.954832 0.0000 
DLMSGR (-1) -0.012493 0.0302 
R 
Adj R 
0.95 
(0.95) 
 
DW 1.81  
Israel 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.000472 0.7013 
RET (-1) 1.348387 0.0000 
RET (-2) -0.587801 0.0000 
RET (-3) 0.223279 0.0017 
DLMSI (-1) 0.004210 0.4069 
R 
Adj R 
0.96 
(0.96) 
 
DW 1.99  
Mexico 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.004523 0.2741 
RET (-1) 0.938680 0.0000 
DLMSMEX (-1) -0.001910 0.9343 
R 
Adj R 
0.86 
(0.86) 
 
DW 2.20  
Poland 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.001970 0.1131 
RET (-1) 1.396936 0.0000 
RET (-2) -0.435258 0.0000 
DLMSPOL (-1) -0.031231 0.0404 
DLMSPOL (-2) 0.031923 0.0328 
R 
Adj R 
0.97 
(0.97) 
 
DW 1.99  
South Africa 
Variable Coefficient probability 
C 0.000114 0.8300 
RET (-1) 1.309374 0.0000 
RET (-2) -0.426229 0.0000 
RET (-3) 0.106420 0.0100 
R 
Adj R 
0.99 
(0.99) 
 
DW 1.98  
Notes: the data is presented as follows RET represents the lagged expected short rate. DLMS is the log 
difference of money supply followed by an abbreviation or acronym of the name of the country. R-
squared is denoted as R and its adjusted 𝑅2 is denoted as Adj R. DW is the Durbin-Watson  
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Chapter 5: conclusion  
Measuring the credibility of central banks relies much on the past information and current 
announcements of central banks. Particularly, the short rate and historic expected short rates are 
instruments where future expected rates may be computed. The instrument is evidently under the 
central banks control used to implement changes in the stance of the policy or regime.  
The spread allows one to determine future expected rates and to compute a measure for credibility. 
Credibility has been proven to be greater than its null hypothesis. However, this is only applicable in 
cases where central banks have not reached their zero lower bound. It is important to note that 
credibility must be measured in a way that does not create any biased conditions. Therefore, 
autocorrelation should not be present as this invites a biased output bought by long-term interest rates. 
During the crisis, the impact of the crisis weakened the credibility of central banks resulting to weaker 
reliance on central banks of both markets. This proves that agent’s expectations are dependent upon 
the announcement or actions of central banks.  
A consequence to the crisis is how most advanced economies such as the Federal Reserve, Japan, 
Bank of England other European economies have relied on unconventional policy tools such as 
quantitative easing where purchases of large-scaled assets. A question arises if it is coping in terms of 
its flexibility to adjust to any impact? The result is presented from Japan where the impression of the 
policy requires much planning and precision. This implies that any impact may hinder its policy more 
resulting to a further weaker magnitude of credibility as proven during the crisis. This constant cash 
injection to the economy stimulates the economy however jeopardises the solvency of the central 
bank at risk 
The relationship of historic expected rates on the expected rates makes use of autoregressive models. 
Where the null hypothesis was proven to be stationary, the dependency of historic expected rates 
proved to affect the expected rate. The effect decays with a lag. This was true for some countries. A 
stationary autoregressive model further proves the expectations hypothesis that agents are reliant on 
past events or actions of the central bank. Thus, credibility is proven to be significant and frequent. 
The changes bought by the financial crisis proves to influence central bank credibility where OLS 
estimation find that the decrease in monetary actions implies a loss of efficiency 
The relationship of money supply and expected rates show that money supply has an impact on 
expected rates. The reaction also express that money supply decays over time and thus the expected 
rate is dependent on it. On a more practical note events of the crisis have also presented how fiscal 
involvement is in advanced economies and emerging market economies. Both of the fiscal 
involvement are different. In advanced economies, the need for flexibility exists in cases where 
quantitative easing was introduced under zero lower bound conditions. In emerging market 
economies, a need for more stringent policies exists to make central banks more credible. This is due 
to its reliance on central banks in other markets such the foreign exchange market (Mallick and Sousa, 
2012). A closer speculation of money supply should be considered as this may affect the bond 
market’s choice to purchase or sell. 
In comparison with other studies the results interpreted seem to express the behaviour as in Mankiw 
and Miron (1986) where a stochastic or a random walk due to the changes of central banks change (or 
rather) reduce the predicative power. By drastically lowering interest rates in 2002, this action caused 
a stochastic change that was unfavourable globally and called on the reliance of unconventional 
policies and government intervention. To recommend, central banks must be able to strike a good 
balance between the credibility of its announcements and the flexibility to adjust to unanticipated 
events 
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